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Andrea Cassani, Università degli Studi di Milano 
 
 “We put a rope around our own neck and say leaders must only 
have two terms.” 
Robert Mugabe (Johannesburg – June 14, 2015) 
 
“If a leader thinks they’re the only person who can hold their 
nation together,if that’s true then that leader has failed to truly 
build their country.” 
Barack Obama (Addis Ababa – July 28, 2015) 
  
urkinabé forthcoming presidential election will 
be the first in which the name of Blaise Com-
paoré does not appear in the candidates’ list. 
Despite the former President’s attempt in 2014 to change 
the rules and run for a further mandate, and a failed coup 
d’état in September this year, the country has managed to 
defend its Constitution. While any conclusion about 
Burkina Faso’s prospects for democracy would be far 
premature, the event represents the occasion to briefly 
survey whether and how presidential term limits have 
shaped African politics since they were introduced as part 
of post-Cold War institutional reforms packages. 
Burkinabé people are preparing for the fifth consecutive 
presidential election since multiparty politics was intro-
duced in 1991. The election is scheduled this Sunday, 
November 29, and will provide Burkina Faso with a 
government replacing the transitional executive that has 
run the country during the past twelve months. This is 
already a result, as the risk of a long-term postponement 
was high. Back in September, a coup d’état carried out by 
General Gilbert Diendéré and the Regiment of Presiden-
tial Security (RSP) toppled the transitional government. 
The golpe however was short-lived and in a few days ad 
interim President Michel Kafando and Prime Minister 
Isaac Zida were released and the restored in office. 
The RSP is an autonomous military unit loyal to for-
mer President Blaise Compaoré and its intervention was 
against an electoral law barring Compaoré’s allies from 
running the forthcoming election.This in fact will be the 
first poll in which Compaoré, who led the country for the 
past twenty-seven years, does not appear in the list of 
candidates. This is not to say that he voluntarily retired 
from politics. Indeed the current transitional government 
was created after Compaoré resigned in the wake of Oc-
tober 2014 uprising, a series of mass demonstrations and 
riots sparked by an attempt to amend the Constitution and 
lift the term limit that would have prevented him from 
running for a further mandate. Compaoré was a recidi-
vist. Term limits were prescribed by Burkina Faso 1991 
Constitution, then removed in 1997 and re-introduced in 
2000, along with a reduction of the presidential mandate 
length from seven to five years. Compaoré was serving 
the second mandate at that time, but he eluded the re-
striction invoking the non-retroactivity of the constitu 
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tional provision and run for further two terms in 2005 and 
2010 elections. 
 
Should I stay or should I go? As a constitutional flout-
er, Compaoré has good company throughout the African 
continent. Restrictions to re-election were adopted as part 
of a broader set of institutional reforms that many African 
countries implemented following the end of the Cold 
War. Hopes run high that these measures “would consign 
the ‘big man’ syndrome of African politics to history” 
(The Economist, “When enough is enough.”6th April 
2006). While they constrain candidate entry, and thus 
voter freedom of choice in some way, term limit provi-
sions may have important returns, especially for coun-
tries coming from decades of personal rule and currently 
in transition towards multiparty politics. As a 
pre-commitment to consider alternative candidates, they 
level the playing field, favour executive turnover, pro-
mote a party-based rather than personality-based vision 
of politics, weaken patronage networks, and reduce the 
stakes of politics preventing electoral competition to turn 
into a zero-sum game. During the past two decades, 
however, African leaders proved to have a rather schiz-
ophrenic relationship with the new constitutions: under 
popular and foreign donors’ pressures, they agreed to 
limit themselves to serve a fixed number of mandates, 
typically two, only to try to scrap them when the time to 
leave office finally came. 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1. Presidential term limits in sub-Saharan Africa 
 
Notes: Term limits are considered to exist only when they apply to a 
president that is the chief executive. Parliamentary systems – e.g. Bot-
swana, Cape Verde, Ethiopia, Lesotho, and Mauritius – are classified as 
no-term limit countries, even when their constitutions contain term lim-
its, unless these apply to the effective head of government – e.g. South 
Africa. The constitution of Comoros prescribes a four-year rotation of 
the presidency between the federation's three islands. Seychelles has a 
3-term limit. For each country, the third and fifth columns report the year 
of the election following the end of the second mandate. The fourth 
column reports the year of the attempted violation instead. The table is 
adapted from Posner and Young’s article “The institutionalization of 
political power in Africa” (Journal of Democracy, vol.18, no.3, 2007). 
Updating and revision are based on several sources, including Carbone 
and Pellegata’s Africa Leadership Change dataset, Freedom House, the 
CIA World Factbook, and the International Foundation for Electoral 
Systems. 
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 Table 1 provides an overview of how African presi-
dents have fared with constitutional term limits thus far. 
As we may note, the vast majority of presidential systems 
in the continent has, or had, such restrictions, even 
though in some cases presidents’ actual commitment to 
abide by the rules has yet to be assessed. With the ex-
ception of Madagascar, this has to do with a delayed in-
troduction of these measures – Zimbabwe being the most 
recent case – or with more or less long interruptions due 
to war. Indeed, for at least two of 
these wait-to-see countries the fate seems to be already 
written. Denis Sassou-Nguesso in Congo-Brazzaville and 
Paul Kagame in Rwanda recently abolished term limits 
and will probably seek a third mandate in 2016 and 2017 
respectively forthcoming elections. 
In case they will, they will join the ranks of Afri-
can over-stayers. In 1999, Namibian former revolution-
ary Sam Nujoma was among the firsts of the new “Afri-
can renaissance” generation of leaders to feel his mission 
was not yet accomplished. Through the 2000s, the list has 
grown longer, with Pierre Nkurunziza in Burundi as the 
most recent case. Surveying the existing evidence, a ra-
ther clear modus operandi emerges. Presidents choose to 
amend the constitution via the National Assembly when 
they can count on an extensive majority. Should this 
condition be absent, they turn to the Constitutional Court, 
typically compliant. As an alternative, presidents may 
resort to referenda, appealing to the need to sustain re-
forms, the weakness of other potential candidates, the 
advantage of retaining the incumbent’s experience, the 
risk of instability, but without disregarding vote rigging. 
None of these strategies ensures success, however, as a 
series of wannabe presidents-for-life remind us. Some-
times the army curbed incumbents’ ambitions, as it 
happened in Niger in 2009. Virtually always, however, 
failure was a consequence of miscalculations about citi-
zens’ preferences and their resolution to stand against 
abuses. The most striking example of misperception re-
mains Senegal in 2012, when Abdoulaye Wade, despite 
massive street protests, continued his controversial run 
for a third mandate, only to be defeated at the polls. 
This suggests that the broad picture of Africa’s experi-
ence with presidential term limits, and multiparty politics 
more generally, is not as depressed as it might appear. A 
bright side of this story does exist. For any African pres-
ident that tries to bend the constitution and outstays his 
welcome, another one calls it a day when his second term 
is over and steps aside with dignity. Among the countries 
with the most punctual leaders are Ghana, currently one 
of Africa’s most lively democracies, but also Mozam-
bique and Tanzania, in which democratic progress is 
stagnating and ruling elites hold their grip on power. 
Namibia, in turn, where Nujoma finally retired in 2005 
and his successor did the same last year, is a reminder that 
previous reversals do not prevent a country from getting 
back on track. 
The road ahead. The emerging mixed record confirms 
that personalization of power and weak institutionaliza-
tion remain two major issues in African politics. While 
respect of term limits is certainly not the ultimate anti-
dote, it may nonetheless represent a building block for a 
more solid institutional infrastructure. As Dulani’s recent 
study illustrates (Afrobarometer Dispatch, no.30, 2015), 
moreover, African citizens strongly support term limits 
and are willing to resist leaders’ attempt to extend their 
tenure. Burkina Faso, an exemplary case of both Africa’s 
political syndromes and virtues, may thus turn into an 
important precedent. 
